| The Doha Development Round (DDR) is a negotiation | | | | the negotiating table. President George W. Bush |
| between members of the World Trade Organization | | | | agreed that the talks were important and expressed |
| (WTO) that aims to lower international barriers and | | | | the desire to have the DDR negotiations completed |
| encourage global trade. Through cooperation and | | | | before the end of his term. |
| negotiation the WTO believes that open trade will | | | | At the end of 2008, the U.S., China, and India again sat |
| provide worldwide economic growth. | | | | down to try and hammer out their differences. |
| Although the negotiations began in 2001 and were | | | | Although all of the parties agreed this meeting was |
| supposed to conclude in 2005, the talks have stalled | | | | necessary to establish the standards of compromise |
| many times, most recently in 2008. While most | | | | for the DDR, the negotiations proved fruitless. |
| developing countries like India, Brazil, China and South | | | | Since the stalemate, Brazilian President Lula has |
| America tout the benefits of open trade there have | | | | personally called several countries leaders in an effort |
| been many contentious battles between these | | | | to restart the negotiations. In January of this year, |
| developing countries and the major economic forces | | | | President Silva became very outspoken about the |
| like the United States and Japan. | | | | United States role in the breakdown of the |
| In recent months, Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da | | | | negotiations. |
| Silva has asked United States President Barack | | | | Criticizing the political will of the U.S. Congress, Lula |
| Obama to make completing the world trade talks a | | | | claimed a deal on the Doha could have been reached |
| priority. | | | | but the U.S. had no desire to reach a consensus. Lula |
| In 2008, talks stalled over agricultural import rules. A | | | | further emphasized how important the agreement is to |
| disagreement erupted between the United States and | | | | poor developing nations whose main source of income |
| India regarding the special safeguard mechanism and a | | | | is agriculture. However, President Obama has not been |
| special tariff on certain agricultural goods. The special | | | | very enthusiastic about certain provisions of Doha and |
| mechanism was designed to protect small farmers by | | | | what he feels amounts to the undervaluation of US |
| allowing countries to impose a special tariff during an | | | | workers. |
| import surge. | | | | Meanwhile, President Lula has responded by saying |
| The United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) | | | | that an agreement on the Doha is needed to provide |
| felt that the procedure for invoking the mechanism | | | | stability to the current world economy. In fact, Lula |
| was too lax. India and China refused to budge | | | | ominously predicts that failure to enact the global trade |
| proclaiming that they needed to protect the livelihood | | | | agreement will result in chaos and confusion. |
| of their citizens. The U.S. and EU proclaimed that China | | | | The actual benefits of the DDR have been hotly |
| and India had adopted an uncompromising position. | | | | debated and purely speculative. Clearly most of the |
| Sadly, both sides refused to compromise and India | | | | developing countries believe that the trade facilitation |
| claimed that their position was supported by more than | | | | will grow their struggling economies and better the lives |
| one hundred countries. Surprisingly, Brazil, one of the | | | | of their citizens. |
| most vocal developing countries, diverged from India | | | | In 2002, the University of Michigan completed a study |
| on this point. | | | | in international economics. According to the findings of |
| The situation was exasperated by finger pointing and | | | | the study, if the DDR agreement passed and |
| name calling with India publicly accusing the U.S. of | | | | succeeded in reducing trade barriers by thirty-three |
| harming the poor. For its part, the U.S. openly accused | | | | percent, global welfare would experience a several |
| India and China of causing the standoff. In its defense, | | | | billion dollar increase. |
| prior to the stalemate, the U.S. did agree to capping its | | | | World Economist Kym Anderson completed a 2008 |
| subsidies and increasing the amount of work visas it | | | | study where she theorized the success of DDR would |
| would issue every year. | | | | result in a three thousand billion dollar increase in global |
| After the negotiations crumbled, Jose Augusto de | | | | income. Other economists shun these astronomical |
| Castro, vice president of Brazils Foreign Trade | | | | numbers and concede that success of the DDR |
| Association announced that protectionism had | | | | would increase the global income, but they warn that it |
| triumphed. Brazil claimed that because it had | | | | is too early to postulate exact figures. |
| abandoned many bilateral deals in favor of the | | | | As the debate about its strengths and weaknesses |
| multilateral Doha, it was now adversely affected by | | | | continues to rage, the future of the DDR remains |
| the demise of the treaties. | | | | tenuous. Even if a compromise was made that |
| However, some Brazilian leaders promised that Brazil | | | | pleased the current U.S. President, the Doha cannot |
| would forge its way into other open markets with or | | | | become law until it has been ratified by the U.S. |
| without the Doha agreement. Other Brazilian leaders | | | | Congress. |
| threatened litigation against the U.S., saying that the U.S. | | | | Critics maintain that the DDR may not be the best plan |
| abused its subsidies to the detriment of Brazil. | | | | for the American economy but Congress will face |
| After the July 30th impasse, Brazilians Foreign Minister | | | | international political pressure from developing nations |
| Celso Amorim joined forces with Susan Schwab, a | | | | like Brazil to pass the trade pact. |
| U.S. trade representative, to bring the parties back to | | | | |